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military intervention alone is not enough
to “end a conflict whose basic cause is
state collapse,” and that peacekeepers
may be better served by developing successful strategies to transfer power than
by focusing on “exit strategies.” These
conclusions are well supported, and it is
difficult to argue with any one of them.
The case of Cambodia, presented in
such a different fashion, concludes that
future military intervention in Cambodia is unlikely. The analysis predicts
that other interventions—notably exploitative economic ones—will increase
and that the forces of globalization will
prove injurious to the average Khmer.
Unfortunately, the chapter ends before
explaining these findings in detail.
The final chapter, written by Lahneman
himself, is in many ways the most valuable. Lahneman provides his own summary of the book’s cases, then identifies
a variety of challenges and prescriptions
associated with intervention operations.
These findings range from the commonsense (“A coalition of willing states
should conduct military intervention”)
to the provocative (“Operations taken
solely for humanitarian reasons tend to
be too little and too late”).
In the final analysis, Lahneman’s book
is less useful for the insights it provides
into the specifically examined cases
than for the questions it raises that
should be answered before any intervention is ordered. This work is also an
invitation to deepen the current national discussion on intervention and
nation building. As Lahneman suggests,
this discussion is too important to be
confined to the ivory tower; the invitation should not go unanswered by the
academic and security communities.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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Moore, Jeffrey M. Spies for Nimitz: Joint Military
Intelligence in the Pacific War. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2004, 336pp. $29.95

Despite its title, this book is not about
spies but about what is referred to in
today’s parlance as “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”: a sustained
process of research and analysis, based
on all source collection efforts, that
identifies important aspects of potential
combat environments. Intelligence
preparation of the battlefield provides
planners and commanders with “combat intelligence”—about the terrain,
weather conditions, enemy order of
battle and dispositions—needed to
conduct an upcoming operation. For
instance, without knowledge of tidal
conditions, currents, the composition
and slope of a beach, or the location of
underwater obstructions and mines,
amphibious operations can be doomed
to failure before they begin.
In this history of the performance of
U.S. intelligence in the Pacific during
World War II, Jeffrey Moore links the
intelligence provided to planners by the
Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean
Area (JICPOA) to the outcome of the
major amphibious assaults against
Japanese-occupied islands. Intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, always
important, was of great strategic significance in the “island hopping” campaign
undertaken by the United States. Planners had to identify atolls or islets that
were lightly defended by the Japanese
yet possessed the anchorages, landing
strips, and flat terrain that made them
suitable as operating bases for the next
stage in the campaign. When intelligence analysts provided accurate pictures of the battlefield, operations
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generally went smoothly and U.S. casualties were light. When they underestimated enemy strength, failed to warn
the assault of strange topographic conditions, or failed to anticipate shifts in
enemy strategy, the outcome was a
grinding attritional battle that generated high losses.
American intelligence analysts and
planners knew very little about the
Marshall, Mariana, or Caroline Islands.
Of course, many of the atolls and islets
targeted in the American march across
the Pacific were extraordinarily isolated
and had been inhabited mostly by Polynesians before the war. More surprisingly, planners also knew little about
American islands that had been seized
by the Japanese in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Guamanians
who had left their home island when the
Japanese invaded had to be consulted
about topography, road networks, and
tidal conditions to support plans for the
assault on Guam. The U.S. Navy had
supposedly been planning operations
against Japan for years; it is hard to explain why so little effort had been made
to gather basic information about the
Pacific islands.
In assessing JICPOA’s performance,
Moore identifies a perplexing trend—
that U.S. intelligence actually deteriorated as the war progressed. Intelligence
performed relatively well against early
targets (Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Tinian,
and Guam), probably because these
atolls were lightly defended by the Japanese and relatively few fortifications
had to be identified in the planning of
shore bombardment. At the start of the
war, the Japanese mostly constructed
beach defenses, which were easy to spot
by submarine and aerial reconnaissance. There were also some early
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successes in the exploitation of Japanese
material and personnel. Documents
that were left behind in Guam by the
Japanese Thirty-first Army headquarters were a windfall of information
about Japanese defenses across the
Pacific. JICPOA, however, lacked the
translators and analysts needed to go
through these materials quickly, a phenomenon that is referred to today as
“information overload.” The tempo of
the campaign was so fast, and intelligence analysis so slow, that important
information often reached commanders
after a battle was already joined, by
which time information could yield
only diminishing returns.
Worse, as the war progressed, the Japanese
constructed increasingly sophisticated
and well camouflaged fortifications in
depth, and the time available for U.S.
analysts to survey and identify island
defenses decreased. Operations were executed in rapid succession, and JICPOA
could no longer keep pace. Intelligence
estimates decreased in quantity and accuracy just as Japanese defenses were
increasing in strength and lethality. The
attitudes of senior U.S. officers also
changed, as American materiel superiority began to take its toll on the Japanese. Intelligence preparation of the
battlefield took a backseat to maintaining the momentum of the drive across
the Pacific. Commanders were more interested in bringing the overwhelming
weight of U.S. naval, Marine, and army
units quickly to bear against the Japanese so that the ghastly attritional campaign might end as soon as possible. As
Moore notes, the island campaigns
were brought to an end not by brilliant
maneuver but by the virtual annihilation of Japanese garrisons.
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Moore looks on the bright side of
JICPOA’s modest performance, but he
finds only one outstanding success by
its analysts during the war. Ironically, it
was in support of an amphibious operation that never occurred, the planned
invasion of Kyushu in the autumn of
1945. Because Japanese garrisons usually fought to the death and inflicted
high casualties on attacking forces, the
five hundred thousand defenders of
Kyushu were capable of turning the
opening phase of the attack on the
home islands into a bloodbath.
JICPOA’s accurate estimates of the
steady buildup of Japanese forces on
the island led military planners to support a less costly way to end the war in
the Pacific—the use of the atomic
bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945.
JAMES J. WIRTZ

Naval Postgraduate School

Lacquement, Richard A., Jr. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 211pp. $67.95

Richard Lacquement provides an important narrative history and critical
analysis of the Defense Department’s
official policy studies and reviews from
the end of the Cold War through the
early administration of George W.
Bush. The book addresses several key
themes, highlighting the scope and
speed of military reform efforts and the
failure, in the author’s view, of defense
transformation. Each chapter provides
a review, discussion, and critique of the
official documents on American defense policy and strategic thinking in
the post–Cold War decade. The book
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traces the major themes and issues in
the official Defense Department policy
reviews, including the 1990 Base Force,
the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995
Commission on Roles and Missions of
the Armed Forces, and the 1997 and
2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews.
Lacquement is an Army field artillery
officer who has served on the faculties
of the U.S. Military Academy and the
Naval War College. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War,
his first book, is based on his Princeton
University doctoral dissertation. It is
the product of serious academic research that is informed throughout by
the sincere search of a soldier-statesman
for better ideas in the development of
the U.S. armed forces’ capabilities to
serve the nation’s current and future
security needs.
From Les Aspin, through William Perry
and William Cohen, to Donald Rumsfeld,
defense secretaries and their official
policy documents have addressed the
Defense Department’s and services’ efforts at transforming the post–Cold
War military. Lacquement’s argument
is that more change throughout the
1990s would have been better. He contrasts the influence of outsiders,
mainly political defense reformers, to
that of insiders, members of a mostly
conservative military culture and status
quo–oriented senior military leadership. Lacquement characterizes Bill
Clinton’s defense secretary, Les Aspin,
and Connecticut senator Joseph
Lieberman as champions of innovation,
while portraying the Joint Chiefs of
Staff chairmen Generals Colin Powell
and John Shalikashvili as resistant to
revolutionary new thinking on defense
issues.
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